INTRODUCTION
Islamist groups have, to varying degrees, a lot of support within some Muslim-majority countries and some of them have moved from leading prayers in mosques to governing in state capitals and preside over political institutions. Assuming power in the realms of religion and politics affect domestic, regional, and international affairs. Thus, understanding how these groups come to power and studying their electoral base are of profound significance to the political science literature. In addition, some Arab rulers have for decades warned their citizens against what they perceive as internal threats; yet, Islamist parties have been winning elections steadily and by a landslide in some Muslim-majority countries.
Even though Islamist parties exist in a spectrum from the far right, to the centrist, and to some degree, liberal-leaning, some Arab rulers, political commentators, and some political scientists treated them as mere ideologues and violent/terrorist actors. The study will delve into the discussions of what constitutes a political party as Islamist or otherwise. This will be emphasized upon in the Literature Review chapter. Furthermore, the thesis does not seek to vindicate Islamists, at large, nor does it aim toward convincing the readers to rethink Islamism; rather, it engages in the previous debate solely to produce a framework by which the parties in the party-support variable (the dependent variable) are chosen and quantitatively analyzed as legitimate political actors.
Relaying on "culturalist" explanations to explicate the existence of Islamist parties and the support they receive in the political arena is not an entirely good approach and model to adopt. Author Jillian Schwedler explains why that approach is flawed. She says that when we start that analysis from the previous starting point we will need to "repeat that the beliefs, norms, and values of Islam (which in any case are varied) cannot explain the diverse experiences and practices of Islamist groups, let alone of the 1.4 billion Muslims worldwide .We argue that we should instead analyze Islamists as rational actors or perhaps focus on institutions, or regime repression, or the exclusions of globalization, or the politics of identity, or any of a number of alternative analytic frameworks" ( Schwedler, 2011) . 1 The theory follows her reasoning and seeks to answer the research question by adopting previous theoretical models that were employed to investigate what drives Islamist voters to the ballot box.
To elaborate, plenty of studies have covered Islamic movements and their sympathizers, nevertheless, there is a scarcity in the number of the studies that address the profile of Islamist voters as political animals. To my knowledge, there are, thus far, only three scholarly articles that have studied the issue of Islamist voters extensively. These studies follow different theoretical frameworks. The studies were driven by the following four theoretical frameworks:
religiosity, clientelism, grievances, and horizontal network. The pioneering scholarly writing on Islamist voters was authored by Garcia-Rivero and Kotze in 2007. 2 Then, another study on
Islamist voters was conducted in 2009. 3 Both of the previous studies focused on religiosity as the core explanation for the support that Islamist received in the countries they studied. The most comprehensive study, thus far, was done in 2012 and incorporated the other three theoretical models. 4 The primary objective of the study undertaken is to provide a tested explanation to the support that Islamist candidates receive in their respective geography. I replicate, in some part, the first study that was done in 2007 to test the impact of religiosity on party-support. Moreover, I employ the first explanation in the third study to test the impact of clientelism on support for Islamist parties. Hence, the theory to answer the research question consists of both religious and clientelist explanations. I am interested in these two explanations because they are the most widely provided justifications for the support that Islamists receive in their receptive countries.
Previous studies have tested their hypotheses in only four countries. I intend to expand the number of countries to include five more countries. 5 Increasing the number of observations offer more nuances and, probably, more accurate results. The thesis relies on data driven from the 6 th wave of the World Values Survey (WVS). 6 The data is cross-national; it includes 10,946
observations from 10 countries: Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Morocco, Yemen, Iraq, Turkey, Libya, Palestine, and Jordan.
The thesis is divided into six chapters. The next one will delve into the literature review, addressing past studies, models, frameworks, and theories concerning the issue of Islamist parties, and Islamist voters. The third chapter will present the theory, discuss the dependent, independent, and control variables as well as the hypotheses. The fourth one will explain the research design and methodology. The fifth one is about the regression models, the empirical test of the hypotheses, the presentation of the results, and discussion of the findings. Finally, the last chapter includes the conclusion.
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LITERATURE REVIEW
This chapter is divided into three sections. First, a discussion about what is meant by Islamist parties in political science literature. Then, some discussion on Islamism and politics.
Finally, exploring theoretical models that aim toward creating profiles for Islamist voters and explicating what drives them to the ballot box.
What is an Islamist Party?
The term political Islam has gained momentum following the "Islamic" Revolution in
Iran (Robbins, 2009 Islam used to a political end" (Knudsen, 2003 Islamic tradition" (Denoeux, 2002) . 10 In a word, it is, then, fair to conclude from the previous discussion that political Islam means engaging in the realm of politics with an Islamic reference. To elaborate, Islamist groups refers to a different body of Islamist organizations that is marked with having "a less formal structure" than the other two categories (Roy, 1994 11 Roy, Oliver. (1994) . Islamist organizations that participate peacefully and mainly in the political process. They seek to win elections in order to be able to affect laws and insert their ideology into the public domain (Robbins, 2009 ).
Background Literature on Islamism and Politics
The heated discussion on Islamism and politics stems from the broader discussion on religions, at large, and its presence in the realm of politics. As Professor Ramadan describes it sometimes as a clash or confrontation not only by two domains of different moral codes, values, practices, and set of beliefs but also a virtual competition over authority. Two different brands of authority. They are: religious authority, and political authority (Ramadan, 2010) . 13 Whereas, Dr.
Hamid claims that the essence of the problem is the mere failure in distinguishing between different religious actors and rather viewing them from a monolithic lens for a verity of reasons that some of them can be purely out of convenience. Moreover, he asserts that religious actors exist in a spectrum. For instance, he argues that it is intellectually ambiguous to cluster the two following organizations or parties in the same category; Al-Qaeda, which is a violent/terrorist organization; and Ennahda Movement, which is peacefully participating and engaging in the political process in Tunisia (Hamid, 2014 ).
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The apparent or real vexing relationship between religions and politics has been for a long time a major source of noise and vehement debates. The debates surrounding the topic at hand can be, to some extent, best described as between those who assert that religions are incompatible with the realm of politics and those who claim that semi-hormonic relationship could exit if it does not already exist. To illustrate, concerning the question of incompatibility, author Graham asserts that religions are not obsolete and rather reviving, he profoundly and fundamentally considers their place in the political arena to be counterproductive, dichotomous, and a "settled long ago" discussion. Moreover, he argues "generally that the domains of religious belief and political enactment have no common ground." Graham employs the principles of political liberalism as a buttress for his argument. In addition, his argument stems from the assertion that the two fields are distinctly different. The political domain is the one where we have no choice but to be involved in since we are unavoidably political agents (similar to
Aristotle's statement that we are political animals) whereas, religion is a matter of one's choice.
Further, if religious doctrines were to be incorporated in making laws that could render the laws to be unacceptable by segments of society who do not follow such doctrine. This inherent inability to follow the law harms the association between the two domains and affects how the public comes to common ground (Graham, 1983) .
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Even though Dr. Hamid does not probably view the issue in question from the particular previous angle, in his book "Islamists and Illiberal Democracy in a New Middle East" he sounds agreeable to the last statement of Professor Graham. Hamid notes that popular parties in the Middle-East tend to incorporate social, political, and religious elements into their movements, like the Muslim brotherhood movement, and once they gain the support of electorate, they would highly, then, seek to insert their religious ideology into the section of society where they govern.
They accomplish that when they sense that the general population could be agreeable or persuaded to accept such agenda (Hamid,2014) .
Furthermore, two authors, Razavi and Jenichen, are likewise proponents of the claim that politics and religions are not suited for marriage. They state strongly in their journal article "the unhappy marriage of religion and politics" that the danger of inserting religion into the political domain is as such not solely because of religion, rather in the way it can be utilized for instance, by nationalist politicians to render feminist struggles secondary to "larger national causes." The religion here could be used as a powerful instrument to "further amplify these dynamics by providing a 'divine' grounding for them (Razavi and Jenichen 2010).
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Culturalist theories or explanations could be understood as belonging to this camp of those who view a contradictory relationship between the cohabitation of religions and politics.
When religious actors assume power, they do not merely engage in domestic affairs but also affect global politics. That is why author Samuel Huntington's theory could be plausibly injected to the discussion. He champions the theory of the Clash of Civilization and the core of his thesis argues that "[the] great division among humankind and the dominating source conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future" (Huntington, 1993 repression, or the exclusions of globalization, or the politics of identity, or any of a number of alternative analytic frameworks" ( Schwedler, 2011) . She does not particularly belong to the other camp of the debate, but she offers a uniquely different approach in studying the matter that goes beyond simplistic and monolithic stance on Islamism and politics, but rather focuses on a deeper, complex, and more nuanced framework.
With respect to the other camp of semi-harmonic stance of religions and politics, professor Ramadan thinks a dichotomy between religions and politics is not necessary. In addition, he uses himself as an example in this regard and demonstrates that having multiple identities while being active in the domains of politics, society, and religion have not been a cause of strain and incompatibility. "I am a Swiss by nationality, Egyptian by memory, Muslim by religion, European by culture, universalistic by principle … There is no problem whatsoever:
I live with those identities, and one or the other may take the lead depending on the context or occasion" (Ramadan, 2010) .
Furthermore, in the journal article "Tunisia's jasmine revolution: causes and impact" author El-Khawas provides an insight to the struggle and political dissonance that used to be a reality and an inevitable trajectory between Islamists parties at large and the "secular" state government. While the author was reciting and analyzing events before, after, and during the revolution, an inference can be made. Dictatorships are a chief cause of radicalization and discourse of fear. Ben Ali, the autocrat who was ousted after some 22 years of ruling, convinced the populace of the threat of religiosity, and branded virtually every opponent to his rule as a terrorist and fanatic. Religious fanatics cannot be utterly pardoned for the atrocities committed under the name of their deity; yet observing the sheer volume of those who had been living in exile for the fear of unjust sentencing in their land, one realizes the absurdity of Ben Ali's government's accusations. People like Moncef Marzouki, who is a prominent secularist and vehement advocate of human rights, were living in exile during Ben Ali's rule and were considered criminals. After the revolution, it is interesting to discover that the well-known secularist, Moncef Marzouki, was the first president of Tunisia. The fascinating fact in this journal article was that the Islamist "moderate" party, Ennahda, who was condemned to unfair trials and sentencing, living in exile, and presented to the public as an incoherent and backward texture to the fabric of the Tunisian's society, was and has been an essential actor in the country's successful transition to democracy. "Ennahda reached out to secular and liberal parties to form a pluralist government. Although the PDP quickly declined the offer, Ennahda put together a three-party coalition government and divided the top positions among them… Ennahda supported Congress for the Republic Party's Marzouki to be the country's president."
This statement seems to be revolutionary and renders Tunisia -to a great extent-to be an almost ideal model for the Middle-East and North Africa (MENA) in reconciliation between two seemingly polarized political forces, secularists and Islamists, for the sake of safeguarding and perpetuating the newly attained democracy. This was evident in the presidency and legislative branch; the former was held by a prominent secularist and human rights activist President
Marzouki and the latter was dominated by the leading Islamist party "Ennahda" (El-Khawas, 2012). The third study on Islamist voters' behavior is a comprehensive one. It starts by first minimizing the significance of the previous studies' findings. To illustrate, authors Pellicer and Wegner asserted that what the other studies found is "a rather tautological result given that this is part of the core identity of Islamist parties" (Pellicer & Wegner, 2014) . The authors, then, provided three theoretical frameworks to explain the phenomenon of Islmaist voters' support.
They are: clientelism, grievances, and horizontal network.
With respect to clientelism, voters who belong to this classification are usually poor, and less educated. The relationship between them and Islamist parties is a "patron-client" type of relationship. Their study has found no evidence for this theoretical model. Grievances, in this framework, refers to voters who are described as having little wealth and higher level of education. Their statistical analysis found support for this theory and the proceeding one. To elaborate, horizontal network profile, the authors say the following: "as the core of the organizations consists of educated, upwardly mobile, middle class individuals, horizontal recruitment implies that the same type of characteristics would apply to Islamist supporters" (Pellicer & Wegner, 2014) .
The previous authors have indicated that religious and clientelist theoretical models are the most cited reasons to explain the behaviors of Islamist voters; therefore, the thesis seeks to answer the research question by testing these two claims in 10 Muslim-majority countries. 
Hypotheses
Based upon the theoretical model, three hypotheses are formulated. The hypotheses claim that certain independent variables affect the dependent variable (support for Islamist parties).
The hypotheses proposed are written as follows. to be what author Zubaida describes as "networks of patronage and clientship" (Zubaida, 1992: 9) . 23 I aim to test the previous hypotheses with data from the 6 th wave of the WVS.
The Null Hypothesis

METHODOLOGY Research Design
To test the claims that were driven from the theoretical model, I use a cross-national statistical analysis methodology with a country fixed effect to account for comparable variations within countries with respect to the different numbers of Islamist parties in each one of them.
Moreover, I estimate two regression models that seek to test the effect of religiosity and clientelism on the dependent variable (support for Islamist parties). I conduct my empirical test using data extracted from the 6 th wave of the World Values Survey. The initial goal was to work with 13 Muslim-majority countries, but I faced some limitations, therefore, I decided to continue working with only 10 countries. In the first three journal articles on Islamist voters, the number of countries included in the data-set did not surpass five. While replicating the some of the models of these past studies, I intend to add more countries and more control variables selected from previous studies on the topic at hand.
I work with one dependent variable (Islamist parties), and other independent and control variables. Religiosity, Level of education and Social Class are three main independent variables.
The other control variables are: Age, Sex, Confidence in religious institution, Confidence in government institution, and Employment status. All the 9 variables are collected from the 6 th wave of WVS and adopted form the first three scholarly literature on Islamist voters (García-Rivero & Kotzé, 2007; Robbins, 2009; Pellicer & Wegner, 2014) . In the first regression, I will test the effect of religiosity. In the second model, I will test impact of clientelism, exemplified in lower level of education and lower social class.
Variables Dependent Variable
There is one dependent variable that seeks to capture support for Islamist parties or otherwise in 10-Muslim majority countries. This DV was extracted form the following question in the 6 th wave. "V228: f there were a national election tomorrow, for which party on this list would you vote?" To address the propensity of political parties in each country, I added a country fixed effect in my analysis. I, also, recoded the responses to dichotomous variables in which "1" would mean an individual casted his or her vote for an Islmaist party, and "0" means otherwise.
Independent variables
Three main independent variables: Religiosity, Level of education, and Social class. (García-Rivero & Kotzé, 2007) . Even though some scholars, such as
Pellicer & Wegner, have stressed that the previous finding is "a rather tautological" given that religiosity is the core of what Islamism means, it is a significant predictor because it shows that self-identification with higher level of religiosity could lead to actual electoral support.
What is, likewise, noteworthy in the table of the regression is that it shows that the relationship is negative 25 between "higher level of confidence in religious institutions" and the prospect of voting for Islamist. This might be in part due to some Arab citizens frustration with the governments of their countries and assuming that such establishment is but an instrument in the hands of the ruling class and not an independent institution. Hence, their perception of their governments' level of democracy and transparency may affect their judgment of these kind of institutions.
The second model -concerning the theoretical framework of clientelism-does not produce an outcome that negates existing empirical studies in the political science literature.
Particularly, the study that was engineered by Pellicer & Wegner. They concluded their study by highlighting that there is no evidence to buttress the theoretical claims for the impact of clientelism on Islamist voters' behaviors. I designed the second model in a manner that replicates what they did but with a larger sum of observations; yet, the results are the same.
To illustrate, Pellicer & Wegner explains that clientelism is best exemplified in individuals who occupy a lower place in the realm of education and socio-economy (Pellicer & Wegner, 2014) . Therefore, I ran the model by utilizing these two main variables. The empirical outcome indicated that most of the correlations between the independent and control variables and the party-support variable are negative and not statistically significant.
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The only statistically significant correlation is between the 9 th level of education "No formal education" and the dependent variable. The co-efficient is -0.039. It indicates that, on average, those with low educational level are statistically less likely to vote for Islamist parties.
The statistical significance is at 0.01% The thesis before you is a humble contribution in this regard and relies, heavily, on existing discussions on Islamism and politics. Quite frankly, writing on this topic has educated me more than I expected and rendered me questioning some of my untested assumptions about issues pertaining to Muslim-majority countries.
The theoretical framework that generated the hypotheses about the effect of religiosity, low education, and low social class, is neither sound nor invalid in its entirety. To illustrate, the argument for the profound impact of the role of religion on an average individual's political participation in Muslim-majority countries turned out to be accurate and empirically supported as highlighted in the previous chapter. However, the impact of clientelism was on the contrary.
In a word, I am content that my theisis does not tell the whole story about the issue at hand and that future studies would probably be more accurate in analyzing and understanding the phenomenon. Further emphasis on the political climate, founding elections, social, and behavioral attitudes may prove to be more valid in answering the research question. Moreover, it would be more profound if a future research studied the issue from a gender-based perspective since that would offer more nuances, explanations, and a pioneering contribution to the political science literature on female Islamist voters. 
APPENDIX A THE SURVEY QUESTIONS
